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Atopia & Aesthetics. A Modal Perspective
  Yves Millet 
Abstract
Living in an era where global exchanges of forms and ideas are the norm
raises some questions about the status of artistic practices.  To explore
these questions, we use Roland Barthes’ notion of atopia and the
complementary yet related notion of Neutral on which Barthes commented
in his later years. Atopia highlights the fact that rather than viewing
current artistic activities as searches for homogenous identity, we need to
view them as belonging to plural communities of practices offering modal
and qualitative distinctions. We suggest that adopting this perspective
sheds light on the capacity of any individual to act creatively within his or
her daily life.  Before considering this last point, we will explore how
adopting an atopic perspective helps to throw light on the relation
between aesthetics and politics. [1]
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1. Introduction
Artistic activity is involved in the general flow of global and multi-polar
exchanges that dominate today’s world.  The transfer or circulation of
ideas and forms, and the constant cycle of borrowing and citation, are not
new in themselves. However, these processes have gained a new
momentum and this raises questions about the nature and existence of
communities.  Would it be right to think in negative terms, to assume that
since everything can be found everywhere, then nothing comes from
anywhere in particular?  Or should we see the situation as something else
in the making?
In the context of globalization everything is to some extent taken over,
reformulated, and reproduced.  Thus from this perspective the notion of
atopia, coming from the Greek ά-τοπος (atopos), seems to describe many
aspects of our present world rather well.  (Atopos literally means “non-
place” or “without place.”)  However, it could be argued that the
elaboration of forms and ideas has always been a matter of interrelations,
a consequence of the specific organizations of contrasting materials that
embody differences.  In that case, what is really new today is the fact that
this activity is now directly connected to new technologies that
dramatically increase the rate of circulation of pictures, signs, and
information.  The density of this ceaseless circulation can make it seem as
if a second or new reality is being created.  However, this sensation is
more a consequence of the speed of the circulation than of the novelty of
the processes themselves.
Exploring the notion of atopia in relation to artistic activity leads us in two
directions.  First, the globalization process delocalizes the simple or
homogenous identity of art works themselves.  Placed in direct interaction
within a network, their identity becomes open, polycentric, or
heterogeneous. Secondly, the status of the artist also changes and his
identity is experienced as plural or atopic.  This blurring of individual
identities and boundaries, the so-called standardization of cultures, has
been much criticized. However, rather than viewing the situation
negatively, our intention is to draw attention to the fact that within this
larger process, a series of modulations exists that is by no means
insignificant.  Today, obviously, certain kinds of diversity are disappearing.
 However, at the same time a new series of differences is making itself
known.  We just need to focus differently in order to see them.
2. Atopia, an exhibition
In 2007, six Taiwanese artists presented their work at the Taiwan Pavilion
of the Fifty- Second Venice Biennale in an exhibition entitled ”Atopia.”  The
very fact that the Taiwanese who organized this exhibition borrowed its
title from the German sociologist Helmut Willke[2] could be taken as proof
of the global and multi-polar exchanges and constant flow of borrowing
and citation mentioned above. The fact that this exhibition was held in
Venice, Italy could also be taken as such proof.  Here is a quotation from
a Taipei Times article that mentions this exhibition:
Taiwan is not a utopia, or a dystopia.  It's not a place.
 Diplomatically it has no space.  Politically it does not exist.
 We can't even agree on its name. …  The theme of the entry
is atopia and refers not only to the political position that
Taiwan finds itself in, but also [to] a twenty-first century
condition that applies to us all.  ’Atopia’ refers to the
situation of post-colonialism we are in.  There has not been
much time to become a country.  Many other places are like
this, nations without nationality," curator Hongjohn Lin (林
宏璋) said yesterday at a press conference introducing
Taiwan's Venice Biennale entry.
…Lin has borrowed the term atopia from the German
sociologist Helmut Willke, who defines it as a non-place, or
society without borders. Globalization, multinational
companies and the Internet are creating a world in which
international markets, non-governmental organizations and
multi-culturalism erase the relevance of nationhood.  Lin has
adapted the term for his own purpose and localized it.  The
artist, academic and drummer said that Taiwan was an
atopian state par excellence.’ ”[3]
It is important to stress two points in relation to this example.  On the one
hand, the notion of atopia seems to be properly used as a concept
expressing a non-place or a world without borders.  On the other hand,
the notion is used to underline the situation of a “nation without
nationality,” especially by Lin Hongjohn, the curator of this exhibition.
 This notion is also used to underline the identity crisis or lack of
recognition that results from colonialism or multinational and multicultural
realities and that pervades a country like Taiwan, among many others.  In
other words, while in the first case, from the journalist’s point of view, the
‘a’ of atopia seems to have a neutral connotation, Hongjohn assigns the
‘a’ a privative meaning.  
In fact, we ourselves are in a position to wonder whether or not the six
artists (“the author Tsai Ming-liang (蔡明亮), the photographer Lee Kuo-
min (李國民), the video director Tang Huang-chen (湯皇珍), the ‘bricoleur’
Huang Shih-chieh (黃世傑), and the comic-book artist VIVA”) actually
share the analysis of their curator.  Or, as is often the case, is the curator
imposing a particular ideological view on the artists’ work?  According to
the Taipei Times article, for the artists, atopia seems to be an enjoyable
source of inspiration, while for the curator, the term is used only in
reference to the negative geopolitical aspects of Taiwan’s position.  The
curator and the group of artists do not appear to be speaking about the
same reality. Whereas the curator is using a set of objects commonly
referred to as ”art” to ask questions about political identity, the artists
seem to be taking a specific action as a starting point and using it as a
potentiality through which to express something about a particular state
of the world around them.
There is a clear divergence in the way in which the notion of atopia is
appropriated.  Why is it that while artists seem to understand the
potentiality of an atopic perspective perfectly, our inherited institutions
(and their representatives) seem to miss the point, holding on to a
traditional vision of the relation between creativity and political identity?
 However, the above example serves to underline the fact that, as
Jacques Rancière points out, artists and institutions do not participate in
the “distribution of the sensible” at the same level.  Whereas so-called
institutions of the avant-garde tend to represent the “archi-political idea
of a form of political intelligence that sums up the essential conditions for
change,” the “aesthetic regime of the arts,” which, according to Rancière,
still characterizes our time, corresponds to a “meta-political idea of global
political subjectivity, the idea of the potentiality inherent in the innovative
sensible modes of experience that anticipate a community to come.”[4] 
In other words, the point of art, given the fact that every artistic practice
plays a role in a larger political sphere, is not so much the representation
of a specific theme (topic), or the what. Rather, the point is to question
how any kind of thing can be the subject for artistic practice:  “The
aesthetic regime of arts did not begin with decisions to initiate an artistic
rupture. It began with decisions to reinterpret what makes art or what art
makes,” Rancière writes.[5] That is to say, artists do not start with
preconceptions about the role that a historian or a curator might assign to
art objects a posteriori.  Instead, artists set out to question the way in
which we think about our relation to things.  In short, whereas one, the
historian or curator, is dealing with forms of change, the other, the artist,
is dealing with modes of experience.  The innovative meta-political
perspective defined above could then provide a means of explaining how
the singularity of art works is compatible with the idea of a global
community.
When Roland Barthes writes, “Art = refined practice of difference,”[6] we
are invited to see artistic activity as a regular disqualification of two
things.  The first is our usual categories and the second is what daily use
leads us to think of as an object.  This generates differences in the way
we perceive our common experience.  This invitation to rethink the
categories inherited from the Moderns, to re-interrogate and re-compose
the articulation of our categories, is as pertinent today in the world of art
as it is in the world of politics, if politics is understood as a way to live
together.  The “refined practice of difference” provides a link between
these two seemingly disparate domains, helping us to make sense of our
common world and the new global community to which we belong and
within which we interact. To consolidate this point, distinctions among
object, thing, and subject are needed.  This process of distinction
introduces an intermediate term between the substantialist disjunction
between subject and object.  
As Heidegger stressed in What is a Thing? the term thing allows an
opening.  This means that a thing should not be thought of restrictively, as
being solely an object of knowledge.  Rather, things exist prior to our
abstract knowledge of them and prior to their practical use.  Even if it is a
cause of knowledge, a thing is first and foremost a free subject per se;
that is, free from classifying apprehension. However, taking a different
position from Martin Heidegger, the shift from objects to things (from
Gegenstände to Dinge) must incorporate the technical and scientific
realities with which our lives are involved.  The shift must not exclude
these realities.[7]  To better understand the theoretical potential of this
extension of the distinctions among object, thing, and subject let’s have a
look at the broader implications of atopia as found in the work of Roland
Barthes.
3. Roland Barthes and the notion of atopia
According to Barthes, atopia originally meant somebody or something that
can be said to be unusual, strange, odd, insane, extravagant, or poorly
thought of.[8]  From his standpoint at the frontier of literature and
philosophy, what Barthes clearly finds interesting about atopia, which
encompasses the notions topos and topic, is the idea of a possible
register of language where the authority of predication and the need to
constantly make sense are contested.  
Atopia can be viewed as equivalent to a sovereign right to “wander off the
point,” to act and think beyond usual social definitions and classifications.
 From the point of view of rhetoric, atopia corresponds to a disruption of
predication and implies a loss of subject (or topic).  Atopic would mean
athematic.  That is why atopia is related to oddness, because atopic
discourse is not in line with common sense. Within the world of rhetoric,
for any speech to be credible or, even better, convincing, it needs to have
a clear and delimited subject.  Atopia blurs coherence, which is the main
quality of speech, in as much as that coherence is the guarantee of
speech’s effectiveness.  At the same time, atopia provides the opportunity
for a more poetic use of speech (or at least a less univocal use of speech)
to come about.[9]  
In the same way, when Barthes refers to the Neutral as “the
nonpredicable,”[10] asserting that a predicate might be “as nothing more
than a moment:  a time,”[11] he clearly wants to promote the idea of
keeping a distance from the authority or violence of language and
paradigm.  In fact, he tends toward the opposite point of view, toward a
world where “the object fades away to the profit of the quality.”[12]  
Finally, what is noteworthy about Barthes’ conception of a predicate as a
moment is the idea that language is not belittled as a consequence of its
supposed limits.  The idea that focusing at the right distance allows us to
conceive of a time before something is apprehended as an object, a time
when that thing already participated in a common (or neutral) dimension
as an indeterminate or non-specified subject, is at once more important.
 This includes new realities that come from technical or scientific research.
 This moment can be viewed as a breath, a moment of respiration where,
from either an artistic or a political point of view, creativity is possible, if
not to say desirable.
Thus, from an aesthetic point of view, atopia lets us foresee a moment of
respiration where mobile and discontinuous qualities provide sufficient
reason to say that a thing, a being, or an event first exists as a free fact
of consciousness before it eventually becomes the object of judgment or
of intellectual determination.  This respiration is none other than the
moment of poetry that allows what Barthes labels nuance,[13] or
variation, to emerge.  It is the source of intensive differences.
In order to fully measure how, from an atopic point of view, contemporary
aesthetics can be relevant for present day politics, we need to consider
two points.  First, we need to examine more precisely how Barthes links
atopia and the Neutral.  Secondly, we need to investigate whether it is
possible to conceive of the relation between artistic singularities and what
Rancière calls a “shared sensible world”[14] as being a necessary
condition of the existence of a community.  
4. Atopia and the Neutral    
Dealing first with atopia, we must be careful to make a clear distinction
between atopia and utopia.   « L’atopie est supérieure à l’utopie.»
 (“Atopia is superior to utopia.”), Barthes says.[15]  Utopia can be defined
as a way of holding up a mirror to society through the projection of an
ideal world.  Since its modern origin, utopias have been employed as 
counter-models to criticize existing society. The term atopia cannot
however be used to refer to this projection of civilization into another
world.  Atopia is not a model; instead it is a potential access to a different
positive perspective on our present world.
Analyzing the makeup of the word atopia, we must understand that the ‘a’
of atopia doesn’t have a negative sense; it doesn’t imply privation.  It
should be considered from a neutral perspective.  According to Barthes, by
‘looking beyond’ the law of predication and univocity of paradigm, atopia
permits a certain level of vagueness within the hierarchical organization
involved in classical representation, a kind of suspension of univocal
meaning in favor of plurality. “The best Neutral is not the null, it’s plural,”
Barthes wrote.[16]  From an atopic perspective, ‘place’ (topos) has
neither a positive nor a negative determination.  Instead, it can be
thought of as a common “polycentric” ground where we are led toward
another conceptualization in which our relation to the world has a modal
nature rather than a disjunctive nature, such as the subject-object
relation. 
Within this conceptualization, each mode corresponds to a singular given
situation, and a position corresponds to our experience of the specific
situation of which we are a component.  The notion of atopia does not
stress an absence of place; rather, it encourages us to think of the notion
of place in a different way.  A place should not be conceived of as a closed
delimitation equivalent to a guarantee of stable identity with fixed
borders.  Rather it should be viewed as a limitless limit. Topology provides
a means of visualizing this kind of experience.  Unlike metric space, which
is based on measurable distances, in topological geometry the local and
the global are simultaneously co-present within what are called zones of
neighborhood.  There is no distance separating me from the place where I
am.  
Instead, there is a continuum like a Möbius strip, or a complex of relations
where I am in place and place is in me. Turning now to the neutral, this
notion corresponds to a pre-individual common nature from which the
process of the individuation of different singularities emerges.  Echoes of
this idea can be found in the work of Gilles Deleuze:  “Just as singularity
as differential determination is pre-individual, so is individuation as
individuating difference an ante-I or ante-self.  The world of ‘one’ or ‘they’
is a world of impersonal individuations and pre-individual singularities; a
world that cannot be assimilated to everyday banality but one … in which
resonates the true nature of that profound and that groundlessness which
surrounds representation, and from which simulacra emerge.”[17]  On the
question of individuation, Barthes follows Deleuze.[18]  Both agree on the
idea that “difference precedes generic, specific and even individual
differences within being.”[19]  Considering this ante-predicative reality,
which is at the same time undifferentiated and determinable, we once
again find ourselves facing the same quality of vagueness previously
mentioned in connection with atopia. 
However, here vagueness is not synonymous with reverie and should not
be thought of negatively.  Here vagueness is viewed as a mark of both
indetermination and potentiality. In other words, only individual numerical
units, as objects of intellect, are predicable while what is common,
because it is shared by several items at the same time, cannot be
predicable and must be considered neutral.  Furthermore, as previously
mentioned, at the same time the neutral marks a time when a thing exists
as pure experience before it is grasped as an object.  But I would like to
underline that ‘before,’ as it is used above, should not be understood in
purely temporal terms.  Rather, it represents logical anteriority, a constant
pre-individual potentiality for a thing to be the subject of a singular
individuation.
Since politics is always implicit[20] in Barthes’ work, it is possible to apply
the discussion in a political context.  Within any given community, despite
social determinations or intellectual categorizations that arise as a
consequence of judgments or analysis, the undifferentiated or atopic
reality discussed above is present in each person and should be
understood as none other than the possibility for freedom or creativity.
5. Common / Singularity
Let’s look more closely at the relation between atopia and creativity within
the political context of a community.  At the end of Section 3, we used the
work of Rancière to ask whether it is possible to conceive of the relation
between artistic singularities and the possibility of a “shared sensible
world” as the possibility, or otherwise, of the coexistence of singularity
and plurality.
If we focus on the relation between singularity and plurality within a
shared experience of a sensible community, it is necessary to say that it
is not enough to think of a community as being plural in nature or as
being made up of a large diversity of components.  It is also necessary to
consider the idea that each subject in the community (whatever
community we are talking about) is plural in itself. That is to say, each
subject is as much the sum of the plurality of which it is composed as it is
the sum of the potentialities of this very plurality.  The identity of a
subject is not reducible to the sum of that subject’s properties but must
be understood through the deployment of the subject’s qualities.  From an
atopian perspective, the identity of a thing, a being, or an event is in its
qualitative deployment from which real differences emerge.  This
deployment can be viewed as equivalent to transformation over time or to
a process of individuation.
This qualitative approach does away with any kind of conventional
principle of identity.  What matters is no longer the notion of individual or
group identity as an absolute category but rather relations themselves,
relations which precede forms understood as marks of identity.  Assuming
this to be the case, it is not possible to think about community without
thinking about the notion of commonalities, without inquiring into the
nature of what is common between the different plural entities that make
up the community. The only way to proceed is not to conceive of the
community as a gathering of different subjectivities but instead, as Jean-
Luc Nancy pointed out, to conceive of a community as an interval where
“the inter of the in-common, …should be thought beyond any logic of
subjectivity,” which means it should be thought of as “an empty topos of
the interval.”[21]  
Nancy’s work on community stresses the idea that community should not
be thought of as a substance but as an experience, as a condition rather
than as a value.  As a consequence, “we can only derive the subject from
the in-common, not the reverse.”[22]  Therefore, the “empty topos of the
interval,” lived as an experience of “being in-common,” is present
between each component of a community and within each subject.
 Interestingly, in order to illustrate his ideas concerning the interval and
its pertinence when thinking about the notion of community, Nancy turns
to a musical metaphor.  Numerous references to music also occur in the
work of Barthes himself.[23]  “In Western music,” Nancy says, “the
interval is the name for a combination of two notes played at the same
time, thus creating a sound that we hear as a new note.  The separate
notes composing the interval are still audible but at the same time
something new has installed itself between them….The interval ‘is’
nothing: it is nothing without its elements, and still it is something
different from its elements.”[24]
The interval in music provides a metaphorical analogy for the way that
singularity can combine with plurality.  Although a note can be conceived
of as a clearly defined entity, it is in fact also a vibration and not solely a
rigid body.  A note is not a monad with a closed, unchanging identity.
 Notes are always interpreted in relation to a wider milieu of other notes
within which they interact.  Like a note, all places, since they are inhabited
by both humans and non-humans, are bound to each other with greater
or lesser degrees of implication.  And as the brief topological digression in
Section 4 puts forward, there is no opposition between local and global;
there are only intrinsic modal differences.  
Taking an atopian perspective provides the opportunity to switch from the
two notions, “local” and “global” that, since the modern age, became the
usual and limiting ways of thinking about questions of territory and
identity, to the two notions: singularity and common.  As is the case for
any individuality, the identity of a locality is an ongoing process of
modulations of intervals.  In fact, if everything is local, the local has never
been a closed entity. Rather, the local always presents degrees of
interrelation with variations of intensity.
 6. Atopia and “aesthetic engagement”
To conclude, let’s look in more detail at how the term ‘atopia’ relates to
people.  The notion of ‘atopia’ helps us to see that cohabiting, or living
together, requires a certain level of vagueness.  Atopia can be used to
designate a certain common part of each of us.  This part is neutral
because it is pre-individual and impersonal.  It cannot be referred to with
an “I” of identity or with a unilateral collective “we.”  Instead, it must be
referred to as “it,” as in it is talking, it is writing, it is creating, etc.  
In other words, atopia indicates a part of ourselves and between each of
us that cannot be localized.  That part is Nancy’s “empty topos of the
interval.”  It is the part that escapes from any kind of control but whose
escape is possible because it creates a difference by doing so:  The
nothing which is nonetheless something.  This common part of each one
of us is pertinent in relation to artistic activity and in broader terms in
relation to our common sensory experience and our capacity to interact
creatively with our own lives.
Creative activity, as Alfred North Whitehead put it, “aims at preservation
of the components and at preservation of intensity” of emotion.[25]
 Applied in a wider context, this definition seems to advocate paying more
heed to new or emerging singularities, while at the same time reinforcing
the idea that there is a part that is common to every subject.  It is this
part that provides the opportunity for each individual to be a stakeholder
in a common project and to experience what Arnold Berleant calls
“perceptual commons.”[26]  These commons are the sensory node that
binds aesthetics and (meta-) politics together.
From the point of view of sensory perception (aesthesis), the notion of
‘atopia’ provides an opportunity to conceive quality as intensity, as being
a sliding scale on which differences within shared common realities can be
measured.[27] Encouraging this perspective means encouraging thinking
about the world as a theatre of dynamic qualities rather than as a
conglomeration of substantiated objects; as Barthes says, a “world of
qualities, not of qualified, predicated substances."[28]  Within whiteness
there is always a certain degree of white but this is not recognizable as a
consequence of where or how the white is named but rather as a
consequence of its intensity, an intensity that already exists prior to the
process of abstract cognition.[29]
The specific moment of sensory perception becomes the opportunity to be
more sensitive about what and whom we are living with and (hopefully)
what and whom we are concerned about.  As a consequence, the creative
interval that the notion of ‘atopia’ implies could be regarded as a way to
actively live our “aesthetic engagement” as the first condition of existence,
as Berleant puts it.[30]  This interval lived as an aesthetic engagement
refers to a specific way of being an actor of one’s own life, since a practice
is nothing other than a moment of freedom seized and is equally
meaningful in artistic activity and for all of us in our everyday lives.  This
is what Barthes invites us to see when he announces, “What I am looking
for, during the preparation of this course, is an introduction to living, a
guide to life (ethical project):  I want to live according to nuance.”[31]
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